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Abstract
The prospective Free Trade Agreement of the Americas seeks to 
link the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (with the 
exception of Cuba) with Canada and the United States, thereby
forming the largest free trade area in the world. Given the huge 
asymmetries in the size and level of development of participating
countries, the major challenge in this ambitious and complex process
will be to ensure that all countries, especially the smallest and least 
developed ones, benefit from trade liberalization within the 
hemisphere.
This study argues that whether FTAA translates into benefits for
its members will depend largely on how these asymmetries are
addressed. In particular, countries will need to conserve margins of 
flexibility in fostering productive development in order to increase 
their competitiveness and manage their capital accounts as instruments
of macroeconomic regulation. According to the study, new and 
ambitious initiatives, such as the creation of cohesion or integration
funds, and an increase in the international mobility of labour will also 
be necessary in order to achieve convergence in the levels of
development of participating countries. 
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Introduction
In 1994, Latin American and Caribbean countries (except Cuba)
embarked with Canada and the United States in the construction of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA would be the
largest free trade area in the world with a combined population of 
800 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) of about
US$ 11 trillion. It is, indeed, an ambitious project and a formidable
challenge given the wide asymmetries in size and economic
development of the participating countries. 
A confluence of different factors, including developments in 
global markets, country specific conditions, and economic policies,
will have a bearing on the extent to which countries will benefit from
hemispheric trade liberalization. This paper argues that the way
asymmetries are addressed will have an effect on the capacity of
countries, particularly the smaller and less developed, to benefit from
expanded trade opportunities. In particular, it claims that it will be
important for development that member countries preserve margins of 
flexibility in FTAA disciplines to adopt active productive development
policies to improve competitiveness, and to manage the capital account
as an instrument of macroeconomic regulation. Furthermore, it argues
that convergence of development levels among the countries of the 
hemisphere may require new ambitious initiatives, particularly the 
design of cohesion/integration funds and increased labour mobility.
Alongside the FTAA agreement, hemispheric cooperation on these 
topics will effectively help strike a balance among countries of such
wide disparities in size and level of development.
7
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Section I looks at the FTAA in the context of current trade policies and agreements. Section 
II analyses the treatment of asymmetries in trade agreements and suggests that the current practice 
of dealing with asymmetries might impose serious constraints to developing countries. Section III 
addresses the importance of preserving autonomy to foster productive development and manage
capital flows. Section IV examines prospects for income convergence and highlights the experience 
of Puerto Rico in the post-war period. Section V suggests areas where cooperation could be 
broadened.
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I. The context for the FTAA 
In an effort to meet the challenges posed by globalization, Latin 
American and Caribbean countries opened up their trade regime and 
sought to redefine their linkages with the global economy since the
mid-1980s (before in a few countries). The steps taken to open up to 
trade were extensive. Alongside unilateral liberalization, integration 
processes were encouraged and a large set of free trade agreements
was signed. ECLAC characterized this trade policy mix as “open
regionalism” (ECLAC, 1994).1
Close ties were also sought with countries outside the region, 
mainly with the United States, Canada and the European Union.2 The 
first of these agreements, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), was the first reciprocal agreement between developing and 
developed countries. Mexico, which previously was a beneficiary of 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the United States and
Canada, entered into an agreement characterized by similar obligations 
to that of the developed countries. Many of the agreements after
NAFTA have, to some extent, followed a similar model in terms of 
structure, scope and treatment of asymmetries.
NAFTA marked a turning point in economic relations between 
Latin American and Caribbean countries and the United States and set
a precedent for the  negotiations toward a  hemispheric-wide free  trade 
1 The rebirth of integration in the region, marked by the creation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1991, was 
accompanied by new impetus in the region’s older subregional agreements, the Central American Common Market (CACM), the 
Andean Community (CAN), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and by a proliferation of bilateral
free trade agreements.
2 The shift in United States’ trade policy from multilateralism to a multilevel approach  that took place in 1985 when President Reagan 
instructed trade negotiators to explore regional and bilateral agreements was key to the reemergence of regional initiatives
worldwide.
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area. Two years after NAFTA was signed, in 1994, the process to construct the FTAA was
launched in the context of the Summit of the Americas.
Improved market access, with the United States market as the main attraction, is one of the 
potential gains from hemispheric trade liberalization. The relative importance of the United States 
market in terms of each country’s foreign trade activity varies widely throughout the region. 
However, even in countries where trade with the United States is relatively less important, this
market may constitute an important destination for some manufactures; improved access would thus 
provide an opportunity for export diversification. On the other hand, in agriculture, elimination of 
barriers to market access and export subsidies, together with reduced domestic support, are 
expected to provide gains for participating countries.3
For countries that are beneficiaries of the United States unilateral preferences, participation in 
the FTAA means reducing uncertainty ʊi.e., an insurance against discretion in the granting of
preferences.4 The cost of this insurance is, obviously, reduced protection and economic policy
autonomy. Irrespective of securing market access, remaining outside a hemispheric-wide free trade
area does not appear a viable alternative, particularly for the smaller economies, if access to the 
largest market in the hemisphere is to be preserved. This is especially the case for countries in the 
Caribbean Basin who lost market share and investment on account of Mexico’s gaining access to
the United States market through NAFTA. Moreover, participation in FTAA negotiations is one of 
the eligibility criteria that countries desiring to benefit from existing preferential schemes must
comply with. 
Beyond the traditional incentives of securing access and expanding exports, the FTAA could
be functional for the attraction of foreign direct investment. This could be particularly important for 
smaller economies willing to participate more actively in international outsourcing. Moreover, the 
FTAA represents an opportunity to discipline the use of contingent protection measures, such as 
antidumping and countervailing duties, which create unjustified barriers. The application of these
measures has affected important exports from the region ʊsteel from Brazil and Argentina, flowers 
from Colombia, grapes and salmon from Chile, crude oil and steel from Venezuela, among others
(see table 1). 
Table 1 




















All countries 383 527 910 174 225 399 45 43 44
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 59 82 141 22 26 48 37 32 34
Argentina 6 11 17 3 5 8 50 45 47
Brazil 24 22 46 10 10 20 42 45 43
Chile 2 5 7 2 2 4 100 40 57
Colombia 4 1 5 1 0 1 25 0 20
Costa Rica 1 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ecuador 1 1 2 1 0 1 100 0 50
El Salvador 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 8 23 31 2 7 9 25 30 29
Peru 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1 3 4 1 0 1 100 0 25
Venezuela 10 12 22 2 2 4 20 17 18
Source: ECLAC, based on U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Aministration, July 2002. 
3 See, for example, Monteagudo and Watanaki (2002).
4 United States unilateral preference schemes include the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) of 1983, the Andean 
Trade Preference Act (ATPA) of 1991 and, more recently, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) of 2000. 
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II. From special and differential 
treatment to a “level playing 
field”
The scope of the FTAA is broad, reflecting the consensus to 
negotiate a wide and diverse range of issues seeking to expand and 
deepen reciprocal commitments into new areas beyond the reduction 
of tariff and other border barriers. Its agenda includes the traditional 
market access disciplines for trade in goods as well as new issues such
as services and intellectual property, including areas ʊcompetition
policy and investmentʊ that have not been the subject of multilateral
negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It also seeks to
improve WTO rules and disciplines wherever possible and appropriate. 
Moreover, the FTAA is set to constitute a single undertaking of 
mutual rights and obligations. It will be a reciprocal agreement such 
that all countries, regardless of size and level of development, will 
ultimately have to assume the full set of obligations. Similarly, in the 
Canada-Chile, as well as Mexico-European Union and Mexico-EFTA
free trade agreements, among others, trade relations are governed by
reciprocity. Differences in size and level of development, which as 
shown in table 2 are several times larger than those characteristics of
the European Union, are expected to be addressed through technical 
cooperation programs and longer periods for compliance with 
obligations, among other alternatives. 
11
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Table 2 
DISPARITIES IN LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SIZE 
A. GDP per capita (at constant 1995 dollars) 1960 1980 1999
Coefficient of variation
European Union (EU) 0.46 0.36 0.37
EU and candidates 0.52 0.65 0.78
FTAA 1.16 1.16 1.26
Highest/lowest
EU 6.0 3.7 4.3
EU and candidates 10.8 20.6 41.5
FTAA 25.9 34.6 83.2
B. GDP per capita, PPP (at current international dollars) 1960 1980 1999
Coefficient of variation
European Union (EU) 0.22 0.26




EU and candidates 4.5 8.4
FTAA 9.0 21.8
C. Population, total 1960 1980 1999
Coefficient of variation
European Union (EU) 1.09 1.07 1.07
EU and candidates 1.19 1.16 1.18
FTAA 2.81 2.55 2.42
Highest/lowest
EU 231 215 190
EU and candidates 231 215 190
FTAA 3 543 5 118 6 806 
Source: ECLAC, estimates based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2001). 
As in NAFTA, treatment of asymmetries will be a result of the negotiation process. The 
transitional measures included in the NAFTA, which allow for differential treatment were, indeed, 
the outcome of the negotiating process and not an a priori concession granted to Mexico on account 
of its level of development. This, as well as other recent trade agreements between developed and 
developing countries have tended to address asymmetries through specific, transitory and negotiated 
provisions, rather than through exemptions to general rules and disciplines, allowing in particular 
more flexibility and time for the implementation of commitments. In the Canada-Costa Rica 
agreement, for example, asymmetries were reflected in differences in tariff elimination schedules 
and in more flexibility in the enforcement of rules of origin for a few products. Technical 
cooperation programs were also provided in the area of trade facilitation and of technical barriers to 
trade.
The current way of dealing with asymmetries is a result of a shift in thinking on development
and trade policies. Furthermore, the emphasis on transitional time frames and on the provision of
technical assistance has tended to narrow down alternatives, relative to how this issue has been dealt 
with in other negotiation processes.5 Up to about the mid 1980s, the prevailing belief was that the 
dynamics of development were different in developing countries. In particular, patterns of economic
specialization ʊthe high level of dependence on commodities with low-income elasticity of
demand— and the associated balance of payments vulnerabilities, were viewed as obstacles to 
5 Differential treatment within trade arrangements to address asymmetries in levels of development and size has traditionally included
five types of provisions: time-limited derogations from obligations and longer periods for implementing them; more favorable
thresholds for undertaking certain commitments; flexibility in obligations and procedures; other commitments and best endeavor 
clauses; and technical assistance and advice. See UNCTAD (1994).
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income convergence.6 Overcoming asymmetries required both changes in the international 
economic order as well as efforts at promoting industrialization through import substitution and
export promotion. In the multilateral trading system these changes translated into demands for 
preferential access by developing countries to developed countries markets, flexibility in the
application of disciplines and, more broadly, non-reciprocal trade relations between developed and 
developing countries. The asymmetrical treatment of developing countries was applied through 
exemptions to general rules and disciplines in a form that would allow for the protection of markets
and subsidies to industries in order to strengthen and diversify the industrial base. Policy discretion 
included the right to maintain trade barriers to deal with balance of payment problems and to protect 
infant industries using industrial and trade policy measures that otherwise would be inconsistent 
with multilateral obligations (Gibbs, 1998). At the same time, more favorable and non-reciprocal 
access to markets in developed countries was granted through GSP and other preferential schemes
determined unilaterally by developed countries.7
Since the mid-1980s, the emphasis on unilateral liberalization led to revisit the way
asymmetries had to be dealt with and the usefulness of differential treatment as it had been 
conceived. The concept changed from a focus on preferential access and differential provisions to 
an emphasis on the difficulties faced by developing countries in the implementation of WTO
commitments. An alternative paradigm emerged whereby the basic objective of trade relations was
to provide a “level playing field” for the efficient operation of free market forces. 
The practice of leveling the playing has led to the adoption of common obligations (rules and 
disciplines). The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), for instance, has been
interpreted as a series of concessions made by Canada, the smaller partner, in exchange for
assurances against future trade policy by the larger partner (McLaren, 1997). Whalley (1996)
suggests a similar conclusion regarding Mexico in the negotiations leading to NAFTA. Mexico’s
objective of strengthening domestic policy reform via adopting common rules and disciplines would 
explain the one-sidedness of the concessions. 
The adoption of common FTAA rules and disciplines is not in itself undesirable, as the
experience of Mexico would suggest (López Cordova, 2001). However, significant tradeoffs may
emerge. As we will see in section III, conflicts may result from further liberalization of investment
and, particularly, by the lack of adequate instruments to manage capital account volatility. As the 
experience of the region in the 1990s suggests, the flexibility to impose restrictions on capital flows 
to facilitate the adoption of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies may be necessary to reduce 
the vulnerability of the countries to cyclical swings in external financing. A level playing field 
approach imposing similar obligations would generate, in this case, a false equality. Thus, the 
greater macroeconomic vulnerability of the countries of the region to external shocks underscores 
the need of striking a balance between these competing interests in the negotiations. 
The practice of leveling the playing field may also worsen asymmetries. If agreed rules 
eliminate the autonomy to adopt active production development strategies, they would weaken the 
linkages between export and GDP growth and may also lead countries to specialize in sectors of
static comparative advantages but reduced dynamism in world trade. This would be the case if 
constraints were imposed on policies that foster innovation, technological development, and 
strengthen the export base. Also, intellectual property disciplines such as provisions related to
patent protection could increase the costs of foreign technologies, inhibit development of new 
technologies, slow down national learning processes, and the narrowing of the technological gap 
with the more advanced economies.8 In contrast to patenting trends in developed economies and in 
6 See, for instance, Ocampo (2001), Whalley (1999).
7 The latter include those schemes mentioned in footnote 4, as well as the Lomé (now Cotonou) Convention, among others.
8 See, Primo Braga et al., (2000). Moreover, as in the experience of Argentina with TRIPS implementation, while there is no guarantee
that benefits will be secured, the costs can be quite high. Nogués (1993) estimated that the transfer from Argentine consumers to
13
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the newly industrialized countries in South-East Asia, the number of patents applied for by
non-residents in Latin America is growing much faster than those requested by residents. This trend 
is related to the use of patents by foreign corporations, which in some cases could hinder the 
development of local production and technological capabilities (Aboites and Cimoli, 2001). 
Thus, unless asymmetries are properly accounted for, common rules may end up limiting the
promotion of new comparative advantages which, as will be argued below, is of vital importance to 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in order to strengthen the relationship between
exports and economic growth. 
foreign producers would be about US$ 425 million per year (17% of the value of  patented pharmaceuticals sold in Argentina in 
1999).
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III. Autonomy to foster productive 
development and manage 
volatility
The outcome of the reallocation of production and consumption
patterns that hemispheric trade liberalization is expected to bring about 
will depend on the final nature of the agreementʊdepth and scope of 
disciplines— but also on a confluence of factors. Among the latter, the 
capacity of countries to promote competitiveness and to manage
capital account volatility will have an effect on the extent to which 
countries will benefit from hemispheric trade liberalization.
In the case of the smaller economies of the region, their size and 
vulnerability pose additional constraints. Recent developments in both 
trade and growth theories suggest that trade among asymmetric
countries may also lead to an increase in income gaps, as technological 
advantages may be cumulative (Ros, 2000; ECLAC, 2000, ch. 11).9
1. Export and production linkages10
Despite overall advances in some countries, opening up the
economy is not a sufficient condition to improving the region’s growth
performance. During the nineties, Latin America and the Caribbean 
had one of the world’s highest rates for merchandise trade in terms of 
both volume  and value. The average  annual  increase in  merchandise
9 By contrast, neoclassical trade theory postulates that when a small country liberalizes trade with a large one, the gains flow
disproportionately to the former since the small country will undergo relatively larger changes in its price structure and obtain greater 
gains on account of the reallocation of production and consumption.
10 This section draws from ECLAC (2002a).
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exports amounted to 8.4% in volume ʊa rate surpassed only by China and a few of the Asian 
economies. However, the dynamism of exports was not reflected in behavior of the economy; the 
region’s strong export performance had weak returns in terms of economic growth (see figure 1). 
The average annual rate of economic growth of the region since 1990 of 2.6%, was less than one
third of the growth in real exports. 
Figure 1 


























LATIN AMERICA  WORLD
 Source: ECLAC.
This outcome can be read, first of all, as the net result of the opposing effects on aggregate
demand of export growth and a sharp increase in the import coefficient, associated with a reduction 
in levels of protection, the tendency towards a revaluation of the exchange rate, and the high import
content of inputs in many of the robust export industries, especially in the manufacturing sector
(Moreno-Brid, 2002). On the other hand, static comparative advantages led the economies to 
specialize in sectors of reduced dynamism in world trade. In structural terms, although import
penetration did contribute to the modernization of production and to new exports based on the 
increased incorporation of imported inputs, it also weakened the linkages between exports and 
overall economic activity.
The region’ share of international trade rose from 4.5% to 5.5% during the decade, largely
concentrated in Mexico. Overall, though, this increase was to a large extent the result of 
competitiveness gains in slow-growth products than of gains in more dynamic trade flows. Thus, an 
assessment of the region’s export specialization during the last decade, measured in terms of the 
relative weight of high-demand products in the export basket, reveals that its quality was quite poor
(see table 3). 
Three patterns of specialization have prevailed. In Mexico and some countries of Central
American and the Caribbean, export specialization can be characterized by integration into vertical 
flows of trade in manufactures mainly centered in the United States market. This pattern of 
specialization allowed these countries to benefit from some dynamic manufacturing marketsʊand,
curiously, more so in the case of the Central American markets than Mexico, as table 3 indicatesʊ,
but at the cost of reduced domestic linkages, given the high import content of such manufactures
(maquila in the extreme case). 
16
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHANGES IN MARKET SHARES AND RELATIVE
SPECIALIZATION INDEX FOR HIGH-DEMAND PRODUCTS 
Market share (percentage) Relative specialization index for
high-growth products a
1990 1993 1996 1999 1990-1993 1993-1996 1996-1999
Mexico 1.292 1.446 1.911 2.441 0.515 0.844 0.679
MERCOSUR b 1.552 1.528 1.545 1.499 0.645 0.828 0.655
Andean Community 0.888 0.822 0.913 0.822 0.298 0.622 0.369
CACM c 0.190 0.230 0.274 0.350 1.550 0.975 1.323
CARICOM d 0.182 0.163 0.145 0.131 0.787 0.711 0.348
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data obtained from the Competitive Analysis of Nations Program (2002 version). 
a
 Ratio of exports of high-growth products to exports of low-growth.
b
 Southern Common Market. 
c
 Central American Common Market. 
d
 CARICOM Community
A second pattern, which prevailed in South America, is specialization in horizontal 
production and marketing networks, mainly of raw materials and natural resource-based 
manufactures. This pattern allowed more domestic linkages (including technological developments)
but generally led countries to specialize in goods that are losing share in world trade; the latter
feature was particularly problematic in the case of the Andean countries (see table 3). Interestingly,
intrarregional trade was a major element in South American trade during the 1990-1997 expansion, 
providing a large content in manufactures with domestic linkages, but such flows were significantly
affected by the broad-based slowdown that affected the region since the Asian crisis. 
Finally, countries in the Caribbean and Panama reveal a third pattern with high predominance
of export of services, for the most part tourism, but also financial and transportation services. The 
most important of all, tourism, is a dynamic component of world trade, but has also been 
characterized by high import contents, particularly in the smaller economies.
The export performance of Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s thus suggests that
strong export-GDP growth linkages and improved competitiveness, particularly in dynamic
segments of world trade, are not automatic outcomes of greater openness. This implies that unless 
countries engage in a coherent effort to stimulate the linkages between export sectors and domestic
economic activities, thus increasing the value added (i.e., GDP) of exports, as well as to encourage 
dynamic, knowledge-based comparative advantages, export-GDP linkages would be weak and 
exports would tend to be concentrated in products for which demand is less dynamic and more
vulnerable in world trade. 
In this regard, valuable lessons can also be drawn from the experience of the East Asian
economies. Recent research has noted that an important part of the success of the East Asian 
countries’ integration into global trade flows rested on discretion to use a variety of policy measures
and incentives targeted at specific sectors and industries which were successful in building 
competitive export supply capacities. Strategic integration was not only confined to trade but also 
included policies that promoted technology transfer.11 One important lesson from the East Asian
experience is that while a deliberate and active approach to integration through measured and
properly sequenced set of policies towards trade and investment cannot guarantee economic
success, success without it seems to be the exception rather than the rule. 
For Latin American and Caribbean countries, active participation in a hemispheric market
requires speeding the rate of innovation, including the transfer of technology, develop new 
production sectors and support learning processes. This entails devising strategies to promote new 
11 See, Amsden (2001), Akyüz et al. (1998), Chang (2001).
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firms and activities, restructure sectors that are not competitive, and support for small and 
medium-sized enterprise to help strengthen the ties between exports and productive sectors and thus 
participate in new trade flows on a competitive basis. Building competitive export supply capacities 
demands creating linkages between activities that are successful in international markets and the 
rest of the production system. A stronger export orientation, particularly based on the promotion of 
exports that are knowledge intensive or involve a high level of value added, is crucial for export
capacity to translate into greater economic growth. 
Although WTO disciplines (and the FTAA seeks to be WTO+) have reduced the scope for
using the more generalized policy interventions of the East Asian approach, a strategy of this type
will require flexibility in the way countries commit to common FTAA obligations. In particular, it
is necessary to preserve margins of autonomy in the FTAA for adopting open economy-oriented
policies to improve competitiveness. This includes intellectual property schemes that promote the 
transfer of technology, the use of incentives to support the diversification of the export supply and 
mechanisms to increase the national content of exports. 
2. External vulnerability
Policy autonomy is essential as well in the use of instruments to manage external shocks. In 
this regard, exchange rate policy should not be subject to restrictions ʊthough macroeconomic
convergence schemes in subregional agreements should be allowedʊ and autonomy should also be 
maintained to use capital account restrictions for macroeconomic purposes, particularly to reduce
capital account volatility.
A competitive real exchange rate and stability of real macroeconomic variables (particularly
GDP and employment) are essential for hemispheric trade liberalization to be successful and 
contribute to an efficient allocation of resources. To stimulate the production of tradables, a
favorable and stable real effective exchange rate must be maintained, i.e., an exchange rate that 
fluctuates on the basis of long-term factors and is not overly correlated with short term capital 
movements.
Developments in the 1990s underscore the difficulties that Latin American countries found in 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate consistent with their commitment to trade liberalization, in 
a situation marked by sizeable and volatile capital flows. The vulnerability of the region to cyclical
swings in external financing thus proved to be a particularly serious constraint to sustainable trade 
flows.
As figure 2 shows, the growth pattern of Latin America and the Caribbean during nineties 
was very unstable and highly dependent on external capital flows. Variations in capital flows were
the main factor behind the pronounced business cycles. Severe slowdowns or outright recession 
followed brief periods of economic growth. External credit booms facilitated rapid growth in 
1991-1994 and 1996-1997, and a recovery in 2000, but these periods were followed by deep 
adjustments in 1995, 1998-1999 and 2001-2002. The result was unstable and mediocre regional 
growth averaging 2.6% between 1990 and 2002. 
18
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Figure 2 












































Countries’ reliance on highly volatile financing flows, in particular short-term credit lines and
portfolio flows, was a key element behind vulnerability to fluctuations in external financing. The 
impact of sharp swings in international financing was accentuated by a procyclical pattern of
macroeconomic management. Upsurges in capital inflows were accompanied by excessive liquidity
and domestic credit expansion, and appreciation of the exchange rate that led to deterioration in the 
current account of the balance of payments. When external capital inflows were reversed, liquidity
contracted, a fear of depreciation accelerated the loss of reserves, and a severe adjustment in the
current account followed. Booms in external financing, which occurred against a backdrop of 
financial liberalization and weak prudential regulation and supervision, ended up in domestic
financial crises. 
Dealing with the destabilizing effects of the boom-and-bust cycles in volatile capital flows 
requires a comprehensive strategy for growth with stability. In this regard, macroeconomic stability
should thus viewed in a broad sense that includes, in addition to the control of the fiscal deficit and 
reduction of inflation, goals in terms of economic growth and its stability. As ECLAC has proposed,
such a strategy should be founded upon action in three areas: strengthening the international 
financial system’s ability to prevent and manage crises and the countries’ capabilities for designing 
preventive macroeconomic policies; speeding the pace of export development and improvements in
the region’s access to international financial markets; and increasing national saving and promoting
domestic financial development so that available resources can be increased and adequately
channeled into investment (ECLAC, 2002b). 
Within this framework, it is essential to design policies that protect from crises and that are 
consistent with the realities of developing countries. In this vein, capital account regulations are 
important complementary tools of well-designed macroeconomic policies, providing additional 
degrees of freedom to avoid excessive borrowing, and help avoid as well an unsustainable 
appreciation of the exchange rate. The capital-account regulation mechanisms adopted by Chile and 
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Colombia in the 1990s represent successful experiences in managing financial account surges 
through unremunerated reserve requirements on capital inflows.12
Therefore, preserving autonomy, within the FTAA, in the use of tools for the prudential
management of capital flows is essential to confront the impact of destabilizing crisis and 
disruptions of trade flows. 
3. Size and vulnerability
The smaller economies of the region face additional constraints. Smallness has
disadvantages.13 It inhibits economies of scale and scope leading to higher production costs and
unfavorable competitive positions. These disadvantages affect both the public and private sectors. 
For instance, the cost of public services is usually higher in smaller economies than in larger ones 
since most public goods and infrastructure services are characterized by their indivisibility.
Activities in the private sector face similar difficulties since economies of scale and externalities 
cannot be achieved adequately due to the small size of the domestic market.
Though higher direct unit costs affect the tradable sector, they are especially critical in 
non-tradable sectors. In the production of tradables, foreign markets offer the opportunity to exploit 
economies of scale and scope, though at the cost of further specializing in a narrow range of sectors 
and products, thus increasing vulnerability (see below). However, scale economies are critical in
non-tradable sectors, for which the market is, by definition, domestic. To the extent than non-
tradable goods and services are inputs for the production in tradable sectors (including activities
such as domestic financing and marketing services), the absence of economies of scale in the
production of the former will spill over into the competitiveness of the latter (ECLAC, 2000, 
ch. 11). 
In addition to these constraints, smaller countries are more vulnerable than the larger 
economies in the sense of being more prone to external shocks.  Vulnerability is associated with 
geographic (country size and its location), demographic, and economic factors resulting in smaller
economies being more prone to risks. Exports from the smaller countries tend to be highly
concentrated in a narrow range of products and markets. The economies are more exposed to 
variations in external demand and tend to suffer from higher terms-of-trade volatility than larger 
countries, thus increasing costs of adjustment associated with trade liberalization. At the same time,
their macroeconomic policy autonomy is more limited, in particular the ability to change relative
prices through exchange rate policy and to smooth out business cycles through an autonomous
interest rate policy.
Moreover, the greater fiscal dependence on foreign trade of several of the region’s smaller
economies compounds the burdens of adjustment associated with the loss of tax income from
FTAA tariff reductions. In some countries (Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
and Saint Lucia), international trade taxes account for more than 50% of government revenue 
(Escaith and Inoue, 2001). In addition, the lost revenue will potentially be more problematic for 
those countries that, in addition to being dependent on trade taxes, face a relatively large fiscal
deficit, as shown in table 4. 
There appears to be broad agreement on the constraints faced by the smaller economies of the 
region to benefit from the process of hemispheric liberalization and on the need for technical 
cooperation and capacity building (VII FTAA Trade Ministerial, Quito, Ecuador, November 2002).
12 For an analysis of capital surge management in Chile and Colombia, see, Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2001), Ocampo (2003), and 
Ocampo and Tovar (1998, 1999).
13 On the other hand, smallness is also associated with advantages, for example, that of greater social cohesion. Ocampo (2002)
explores the advantages and disadvantages of size focusing on the Caribbean economies.
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However, more longer-term advantages in terms of room of maneuver to adopt strategies to 
improve competitiveness are required. Moreover, as the next section will highlight, free trade, even 
with these special provisions, may be insufficient to promote income convergence. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FISCAL BALANCE AND
DEPENDENCY ON TRADE TAXES
(1995-1999 averages) 
Dependency on trade 
revenues
Surplus or small 
deficit
Moderate deficit Large deficit 
Low



















Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Venezuela










Source: Escaith and Inoue (2001). 
Note: Deficit levels are strictlty for comparison purposes and do not necessarily imply fiscal fragility.
These were determined by the average deficits during the period between 1995 and 1999. Countries 
at the upper end of the sample had average deficits of over 2% of GDP (and/or have had volatile 
changes in their deficits); a middle group had deficits between 1% and 2% of GDP and another 
group had surpluses or deficits of less than 1%. 
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IV. Trade liberalization and 
convergence
Will the FTAA, which involves large asymmetries in terms of 
size and levels of development of member countries, be a force for 
between-country income convergence among participating countries? 
Empirical work on trade liberalization and income convergence give
ambiguous answers to this question While some studies suggest that
trade liberalization plays a key role or that even it may be sufficient for
income convergence, others emphasize the role played by non-trade
factors. The study by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) would suggest that 
among regions that are open to each other, the poorer would grow faster 
than average. The authors find that in the case of states of the United 
States and regions of Europe, poorer regions converged to richer ones at 
a pace of about 2% between 1960 and 1985. The authors maintain that
convergence does indeed occur, though at a slow pace. In turn, 
Ben-David (1993, 1996) finds that the removal of trade barriers among
the main European Economic Community countries was followed by
significant income convergence. These studies seem to indicate that 
convergence, while far from being a worldwide phenomenon, could 
prevail among countries that trade extensively with one another. 
Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001), and Slaugther (2001) have 
challenged the empirical evidence of these studies on several grounds,
including issues related to the measurement of openness and the time
period of analysis, and have thus questioned the empirical results that 
trade liberalization necessarily leads to faster convergence. Even if
convergence occurs, many factors other than trade ʊcommon laws and 
institutions, labour mobility, and income transfersʊ are potentially at 
play.
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In our hemisphere, this is best illustrated by the case of Puerto Rico. Indeed, Puerto Rico's
development experience since the end of World War II serves to illustrate the links between trade 
openness and income convergence, but also the effects of other factors that accompanied trade 
liberalization, particularly industrial incentives, transfer payments, and labour mobility.
Table 5 
PUERTO RICO: AVERAGE ANNUAL







Source: ECLAC, on the basis of Puerto Rico National Accounts and 
Baumol and Wolff (1996). 
Table 6 







Source: Puerto Rico Planning Board. 
Puerto Rico’s development strategy initiated in the 1940s, Operation Bootstrap, yielded
robust growth by attracting United States investment and transforming Puerto Rico’s agricultural 
base into an economy led by manufacturing and services. In the 1950s and 1960s, the average 
annual growth of Puerto Rico’s real GDP per capita was 5.3% and 6.4%, respectively. The gap
between income per person in the United States and Puerto Rico declined rapidly, from a factor of 
nearly six in 1950 to a factor of four in 1960, and 2.7 in 1970 (Dietz, 2001). After 1970 the relative 
gap between incomes in the two economies failed to converge any further. In the 1990s the income
gap started to close again, although at a very slow pace, declining to a factor of two in 2001. 
The main ingredient of Puerto Rico’s Bootstrap strategy was the attraction of United States
capital for investment purposes in industries oriented towards exports to the United States market,
within a virtually tax-free environment. Labour mobility, with unrestricted out-migration to the
United States, and a large positive inflow of transfer payments from the United States were also key
ingredients of this strategy.
The package of incentives included industrial tax exemptions and other incentives under both
Puerto Rican and United States laws. From the beginning of Operation Bootstrap up to the
Industrial Incentive Act of 1978, Puerto Rico offered full tax exemption from local taxes and other 
fees, and provided also a variety of subsidies on rent and labour costs. In addition to these 
incentives, exemption from the United States corporate income taxes was granted to firms
(qualifying United States “possessions corporations”) operating in Puerto Rico. Under Section 936
of the United States Internal Revenue Code (Section 931 until 1976), United States corporations 
obtained tax credits against federal taxes attributable to the income earned from business operations
and certain financial investments in Puerto Rico. Section 936 stimulated investment for export, for
the most part from mainland capital. 
Puerto Rico’s industrial incentives and Section 936 shaped the manufacturing sector, which 
grew and shifted from labour to capital-intensive manufacturing industries. The “936 corporations”, 
as they were called, came to dominate Puerto Rico’s manufacturing sector, whose share of total
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output increased from 22% in 1950 to 39% in 1990, with Puerto Rico ranking above all 50 states of 
the mainland in manufacturing’s share of gross domestic product. Manufacturing was the leading 
force in Puerto Rico’s growth of trade, particularly exports of chemical products such as drugs and 
pharmaceutical.14
On the other hand, figures 3 and 4 illustrate the important counter-cyclical role played by
federal transfers in Puerto Rico’s economy, in particular since the 1970s, following the slowdown in
economic growth in Puerto Rico that left the income gap between the United States and Puerto Rico 
unchanged from 1970 to 1990. Federal transfers ʊwhich have represented since the mid-1970s
close to 10% of Puerto Rico's GDPʊ are strongly correlated with the business cycle.15 As shown in 
figure 3, there is a strong positive correlation between federal transfers and unemployment, thus
indicating the counter-cyclical nature of federal transfers. 
Figure 3 





























Net transfers from federal government/GDP Unemployment/labour force
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Puerto Rico’s Planning Board. 
Moreover, the net flow of official transfers compensated for the low saving rates in the 
period, helping to maintain the level of consumption when income and employment levels fell. 
Federal transfers have been much higher than domestic savings as a percentage of GDP since 1974 
(see figure 4). For the period as a whole (1960-2001), domestic savings as a share of GDP 
amounted to 3.7%, while net transfers to individuals amounted to more than 10%.
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14 By the 1990s, Puerto Rico provided 50% of the United States pharmaceutical imports and close to 25% of the worldwide demand for
drug products.
15 See Hausmann (1995), who pointed to the strong correlation of net federal transfers with the business cycle from 1960 to 1993.
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Figure 4 





















Net transfers from federal government/GDP Domestic savings/GDP
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Puerto Rico’s Domestic Accounts.
Furthermore, the high level of sustained inflows of external capital was fundamental to
finance Puerto Rico’s investment rate during the period, given the low level of domestic savings. 
The inflows of external capital averaged almost 16% of GDP in the period, what helps to explain 
the investment rate of almost 21% (see table 7). 
Table 7 

















Average, 1960-2001 20.67 15.66 3.66 10.28 a 7.12 14.87
Total gross domestic 
investment/GDP   1 
Net inflow of external
capital, adjusted/GDP 0.39 1
Domestic
savings/GDP -0.12 -0.22 1
Net transfers to 
individuals/GDP -0.88 -0.22 0.00 1
Net transfers from 
Federal
Government/GDP -0.92 -0.29 0.05 0.99 1
Unemployment/labour
force -0.76 0.01 0.05 0.80 0.78 1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Puerto Rico’s Junta de Planificación. 
a
 This share, given the availability of information, corresponds to the period 1963 to 2001. 
During the 1960-2001 period, federal transfers showed a strong negative correlation with the 
rate of investment as a share of GDP, and a strong positive correlation with the unemployment level
as a share of the labour force. The correlation between the investment ratio and the unemployment
rate was also strong and negative. Federal transfers were thus strongly correlated with the business 
cycle, assuming a fundamental counter-cyclical role. 
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In addition to the effect of transfers on the economy, the massive migration of Puerto Ricans 
to the United States also played a mitigating role. Puerto Rico’s industrial sector was not capable of 
absorbing labour at the desired level resulting in a high unemployment rate in the postwar period.16
Since the 1950s, unemployment has exceeded 10% of the labour force. The unemployment rate 
reached its lowest level in 1970 (10.3% of the labour force), and its highest level in 1983 (23.5% of 
the labour force). The unemployment rate decreased in the 1990s, but still remained above the 1970 
minimum.
It is hard to imagine how Puerto Rico’s high level of unemployment in the postwar period
could have been managed in the absence of unrestricted out-migration and the significant level of 
federal transfers. Net emigration reached almost one million persons in the period 1950-1990, 
declining from a peak of 42,200 per year in the 1950s, to 15,700 in the 1960s, and 9,200 in the
1970s. Net emigration increased to an average of 27,600 per year in the 1980s, however (see 
table 8). According to Puerto Rico’s Planning Board, net emigration reached a total of 
62,169 persons in the 1990-2000 period, almost 2% of Puerto Rico’s total population in the 
year 2000. 
Table 8 
NET EMIGRATION: PUERTO RICO, 1950-2000 







Source: Baumol and Wolff (1996). 
The role played by tax incentives, transfer payments and unrestricted migration to the
mainland, in fostering Puerto Rico’s economic growth, has been subject of debate in the economic
literature on the island.17 For instance, Baumol and Wolff (1996) suggest that annual growth in 
GDP per capita in Puerto Rico during the 1950-1990 period would have been impressive (3.8%) 
even without these advantages, only about 10% less than the actual rate. However, their results also 
show that, although the effects of these special advantages were very small in the 1950s and 1960s, 
they became important to Puerto Rico's growth during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Baumol and Wolff suggest that federal transfer payments during the 1970s, which came to 
represent more than 20% of Puerto Rican personal incomes (between 1975 and 2001, transfers to 
individuals averaged 15% of GDP, compared to an average of only 5% from 1960 to 1975), may
have added a full percentage point to the growth in GDP per capita. In the 1980s, federal transfers 
added almost half a percentage point to GDP per capita growth. 
Furthermore, these authors estimated that emigration added another quarter of percentage 
point to GDP per capita growth during the 1980s. Other authors point to a stronger effect. 
Notwithstanding the controversy over the extent of the effect of migration, it is clear that the 
unemployment rate would have been even higher without migration, which served as a safety valve, 
supported incomes, and allowed per capita income to increase more rapidly.
16 For an analysis of Puerto Rico’s insufficient creation of employment see Santiago (1992). A wage policy more adapted to Puerto
Rico’s factor endowments and a larger proportion of local capital in manufacturing investment might have produced a somewhat
more balanced economy in Puerto Rico, capable of absorbing a bigger share of the labour force.
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V. Toward increased cooperation 
The gains that many countries could obtain from the FTAA will 
depend, first of all, on the availability of adequate technical assistance.
The need to strengthen the capacity of countries to implement FTAA
disciplines and participate fully in the FTAA has already been 
acknowledged in the Hemispheric Cooperation Program (HCP) 
launched by the Ministers responsible for Trade in Quito on 
November 1, 2002. The HCP envisages the provision of technical
cooperation to address the institutional constraints that can be an 
impediment to meeting the obligations assumed under the agreement.
The HCP also recognizes that overcoming the challenges 
associated with trade liberalization in the FTAA involves more than 
technical assistance to implement common disciplines. The HCP
envisages, inter alia, cooperation for “adjusting to integration”. This 
would include the strengthening of productive capacity, fostering
competitiveness, encouraging the development of innovation and the 
transfer of technology. If successfully developed and implemented, the 
HCP can make an important contribution to addressing many of the
constraints of the smaller and less developed economies.
However, for the FTAA process to contribute to income
convergence in the hemisphere, it must meet several additional 
requirements. As we have indicated, the way asymmetries are dealt 
with in the FTAA will be a crucial determinant of the capacity of
developing country partners of the agreement ʊparticularly the 
smaller onesʊ to benefit from an expanded hemispheric market. The
gains that many countries could obtain will depend on their success in
transforming productive structures and strengthening the export-GDP 
growth  linkages.  This  involves  policies  to  stimulate   and  diversify
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exports, and to speed up innovation and technological development. Progress on this area will 
depend on adapting the practice of leveling the playing field to the realities of countries in the 
hemisphere, and thus preserving flexibility in FTAA obligations to adopt active production 
development policies to improve competitiveness.
In addition, gains will depend as well on curbing the vulnerability of the economies to capital 
flows. This, in turn, means that there must be sufficient autonomy to adopt counter-cyclical
macroeconomic policies, including capital-account regulations. As mentioned earlier, regulations of 
capital flows give additional room to moderate cyclical upswings and avoid unsustainable 
appreciation of the exchange rate, thus serving as a complementary tool of sound macroeconomic
policies. Through its effects on the real exchange rate and its stability, it may also serve a 
sustainable transformation of productive structures in the face of deeper trade liberalization. 
Finally, free trade, even with special provisions that take asymmetries into account, may be
insufficient as a force for between-country income convergence. Two fundamental complements are
cohesion/integration funds and increased labour mobility. Funds can play a key role in accelerating
convergence of income levels within the hemisphere. As the experience of Puerto Rico illustrates, 
such transfers can play a crucial role in alleviating economic and social adjustment costs in the
more disadvantaged areas, and can also provide a useful counter-cyclical device. 
The European Union is obviously the case where this principle has been applied most
forcefully. It is indeed symptomatic of the political philosophy underlying European integration that 
deepening economic integration during the final decade of the twentieth century was accompanied
by the increased use of explicit cohesion policy (Marín, 1999). What is more, this policy was 
extended to the Central and Eastern European countries that are candidates for joining the Union. 
The possibility of setting a cohesion or integration fund to provide the necessary backing for 
hemispheric agreement was put forward by the number of Heads of State at the Summit of the 
Americas held in Quebec in April 200118 and therefore warrants special attention. 
Labour migration can also be a major force for a more equitable distribution of FTAA gains.
Along with liberalization of trade and investment, inclusion of labour mobility in the hemispheric
agenda could have an equalizing force. As Rodrik (1997) has shown, the lack of labour mobility
relative to that of capital skews the distribution of income against the less mobile factor, particularly
the abundant low-skilled labour in the developing economies.
Thus, in order for labour mobility to contribute to equity it is essential that it include not only
skilled workers but also less skilled workers.19 Winters (2002) has estimated that movements of 
workers for limited periods of time from developing to industrial countries could produce gains that
exceed the full liberalization of trade in goods.20 These results suggest that global gains from
unskilled labour mobility exceed those from skilled labour mobility.
Labour mobility is no doubt a controversial subject. Economic theory indicates that an inflow
of low-skilled workers from developing countries would put downward pressure on wages of 
unskilled workers in industrial countries. This is supported by empirical evidence, which indicates 
that the inflow of unskilled workers to the United States has contributed to a decline in the relative 
earnings of unskilled workers, thus exacerbating the skill bias of technological change (Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz, 1997). 
18 The President of Mexico made particular reference in Quebec to a cohesion fund, and a number of prime ministers from the 
Caribbean drew attention to the importance of integration funds. The Government of Ecuador, which coordinated the negotiations 
until November 2002, later proposed that a fund be established to promote competitiveness.
19 In NAFTA, the movement of natural persons is limited to business personnel.
20 The effects of increasing temporary workers’ permits industrial countries by 3% of their current skilled and unskilled forces would 
produce economic benefits exceeding US$ 150 billion per year, compared with those of US$ 66 billion for complete goods trade 
liberalization, shared between developed and developing countries.
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It has been suggested that a mitigating factor is that demographic trends in the United States 
(and in other industrial countries as well) would lead to rising relative wages for unskilled labour. 
As a consequence, there would be a good potential for increased flows of unskilled workers in an 
environment of stable relative wages (World Bank, 2002). Moreover, immigrant workers can play a 
crucial role in meeting a country’s growing need for labour. As recent research suggests, the 
economy of the United States in the 1990s was overwhelmingly dependent on immigrant workers 
for its employment growth (Sum, Fogg, and Harrington, 2002). 
On the other hand, a selective migration policy that favors skilled labour mobility increases
income gaps in source countries. It also drains their human capital, generally a scarce factor of 
production, and may thus become an additional determinant of income divergence. Furthermore,
skilled labour may end up being employed in jobs requiring lesser skills in the recipient countries, 
due to other disadvantages it faces (language disadvantages, lack of knowledge of recipient labour
markets, inadequate educational accreditation agreements, etc.). This implies that, from the point of 
view of source countries, a more balanced migration policy in recipient or even a bias in favor of 
unskilled labour is certainly preferable. 
Greater collabourative action on this highly sensitive economic and political issue could take 
place within the Summit of the Americas process, which provides the broader  framework for the 
FTAA. Already the Summit offers opportunities for greater collabourative action and its agenda
includes explicit commitments on migration, human rights and equity, and calls for the 
strengthening of cooperation among the countries to address these issues. 
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